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1
“SAIGON, Vietnam—Settle back, take a grip on your chair, and today let us take up the
Magnificent Goof known as ‘Radio Vietnam’—which, in one electronic nutshell, will give you
the whole fantastic story of what’s happening to your tax millions out here.” 1 So began the third
article of a six-part series written by reporter Albert M. Colegrove and syndicated in newspapers
across the United States in July of 1959 by the Scripps-Howard media company. 2 Each day for
six consecutive days, a new story appeared under the banner headline: “Our Scandal in
Vietnam,” and each story focused on a different example of waste or mismanagement of the
multi-billion-dollar U.S. foreign aid program in the Southeast Asian country.
The saga of Radio Vietnam, according to Colegrove, went like this: after South Vietnam,
officially known as the Republic of Vietnam, gained independence from France in 1954, the new
state inherited a small three-station radio chain. As part of a technical assistance program to the
young nation, American telecommunication advisors presented a plan to grow the radio network
with a series of low-powered local stations, thereby connecting the predominately rural citizenry
with news from the capital in Saigon. The information minister for South Vietnam, Tran Chanh
Thanh, would have none of it, however. Instead of local stations, Thanh demanded a 100,000watt shortwave transmitter that could broadcast directly to the United States. Recognizing a
sympathetic audience in the fight against communist North Vietnam, Thanh wanted to keep the
plight of his country fresh in the minds of the American people. When the American advisors
suggested a 100,000-watt transmitter might be overkill, Thanh refused to agree to the proposal
for local stations. A secondary plan called for a new $25,000 transmitting station in Saigon, only

Albert M. Colegrove, “Our Scandal in Vietnam: Your Tax Dollars Tossed Away on Radio Boondoggle,”
Washington Daily News, Jul. 22, 1959.
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In 1959, Scripps-Howard owned 18 daily newspapers with markets in Washington D.C., New York, Pittsburgh,
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Knoxville, Memphis, Fort Worth, El Paso, and Denver. U.S. Department of
Commerce, Distribution Data Guide, vol. 6 (1), Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959.
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to find out after construction was complete that the antenna tower had been built too close to the
airport. Next came the firing of the director of Radio Vietnam after he embezzled more than
$400,000 of American aid money and burned all his records in a literal dark alley. The new
director brought his own fixation to the role, insisting that Radio Vietnam needed the ability to
jam all communist broadcasts from North Vietnam, not only in the south, but in all of Asia.
While U.S. administrators denied his request just as they had denied the request for the 100,000watt transmitter, they did agree to finance a project to air condition Radio Vietnam’s Saigon
studios for $27,000. Unfortunately, the contractor was paid in advance and skipped out halfway
through the job. The air conditioners sat disconnected from the ducts, and the studios stayed
stifling.
Colegrove’s tale of Radio Vietnam eventually came full circle, after South Vietnam saw
its hopes for a high-powered transmitter raised and then dashed again. A man named Abbott
Washburn, the deputy director of Voice of America, the state-owned international broadcasting
agency, happened to be consulting in Saigon and promised to gift the fledgling country a 50,000watt transmitter from the U.S. Information Agency that could at least reach North Vietnam to
counter communist messaging. 3 South Vietnamese officials were jubilant. After his return
stateside, however, Washburn discovered that he could not legally “donate” the transmitter. To
save face, the United States Operations Mission, the aid division of the U.S. Embassy in South
Vietnam, sandwiched $100,000 into the budget to purchase the equipment later. At the time of
Colegrove’s reporting, American advisors had managed to convince South Vietnamese officials
to move forward with the original plan to construct the local stations. 4

During the Cold War, the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency oversaw Voice of America
broadcasts as part of foreign policy, transmitting worldwide and aiming to counteract communist propaganda. For an
overview of VOA, see Alan L. Heil, Voice of America: A History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).
4
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In the weeks and months before Scripps-Howard published Colegrove’s exposé,
Congressional debate over the Foreign Aid Authorization Act for 1960 resulted in increased
media coverage of the United States’ foreign aid program writ large. Since the end of World War
II and the implementation of the Marshall Plan for Western Europe, foreign aid had come to
occupy an uneasy position in the arsenal of American foreign policy. Many politicians and their
constituents believed that foreign aid should be a temporary tool, contingent on extraordinary
circumstances, like the crisis of global war, rather than a permanent expenditure furnished
indefinitely by the American taxpayer. In 1951, three years into the Marshall Plan, a Gallup poll
asked Americans where they thought the U.S. government could cut down its spending. Only
seven percent answered to reduce aid to foreign countries. 5 In 1959, the same year that
Colegrove was writing, that figure had risen to 17 percent. 6 Yet, when Gallup asked Americans
if they knew how much money President Dwight D. Eisenhower requested from Congress for
foreign aid, only six percent could offer an informed answer. 7
Confusion over the obscure and complex nature of foreign aid was not limited to the
American public. Throughout the 1950s, many members of Congress grew increasingly restive
over the state of American foreign aid policy. One of these was Senator Mike Mansfield, a
Democrat from Montana, who would go on to serve as the longest-running Senate Majority
Leader in that chamber’s history. At the time of Colegrove’s reporting, Mansfield was serving as
the Majority Whip as well as a key member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He also
happened to be one of the few legislators who had been calling for reform of foreign aid
practices since the early 1950s. Three months before Colegrove’s articles appeared, Mansfield

George Gallup, “Survey #480-K,” The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, vol. 2, 1949-1958 (1972): 1016.
Gallup, “Survey #612-K,” The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, vol. 3, 1959-1971 (1972): 1605.
7
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gave a speech highly critical of foreign aid administration, stating that the only certainty about
the $60-70 billion spent on foreign aid since the end of World War II was that it cost Americans
money. With no specific objectives by which to judge that expenditure, Mansfield argued that
neither the Senate, the House, the Eisenhower Administration, nor the American people could
have any way of knowing whether the appropriations were worth the price. Most tellingly,
Mansfield charged the Eisenhower Administration with ignoring evidence of corruption and
mismanagement of elements of foreign aid that bordered on the scandalous. 8
In 1959, Americans had little idea that a small country in Southeast Asia would come to
dominate U.S. foreign policy for the next decade and a half or that more than 58,000 Americans
would lose their lives in a conflict half-way around the world, exposing searing and indelible
fault lines in American society and state policy in the process. 9 At the time of Colegrove’s
reporting, there were only a handful of correspondents posted in Vietnam, multiple potential hot
fronts in an increasingly entrenched Cold War, and a media landscape that was changing in
fundamental ways. As scholars like Sam Lebovic and Matthew Pressman have demonstrated, not
only did the late 1950s coincide with a contested rise of the interpretive news story over
straightforward, factual coverage of what elite actors said and did, but the midcentury was also a
time when certain elements of the media challenged the very definition of freedom of the press
and attempted to expand legal protection over the quality, diversity, and accuracy of news. 10
Although the second attempt was largely a failure, the rationale behind both of these

Speech, “A New Approach to Foreign Aid,” by Mike Mansfield, May 15, 1959, Mss 065, Series XXI, Box 40,
Folder 27, Mike Mansfield Papers, Mansfield Library Archives and Special Collections, University of Montana,
Missoula, MT.
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and Records Administration, n.d., https://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.
10
Sam Lebovic, Speech and Unfree News: The Paradox of Press Freedom in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2016) and Matthew Pressman, On Press: The Liberal Values That Shaped the News (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
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consequential efforts lay in the belief that an increasingly modern and complex world
necessitated changes in the way mass media functioned in the world’s largest democracy.
It was against a media backdrop still largely stitched together by consensus, however,
that Scripps-Howard published Colegrove’s series. The exposé followed a spate of favorable
coverage of the foreign aid program in Vietnam that had recently appeared in the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, and Business Week. In fact, the Business Week feature
was so positive that the director of the International Cooperation Administration, the main
agency for foreign aid, sent a copy of it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, believing it
to be much “more balanced in its treatment” than Colegrove’s “sensationalism.” 11
Members of the loyal press pool were hardly the only ones caught off-guard by the
articles, and officials in the State Department quickly issued denials of Colegrove’s claims.
Within a day of the first article, however, Senator Mansfield had already called for an
“immediate exploration” of the situation. 12 The timing of the series was highly significant. Only
twelve days prior to its publication, the Senate had passed the Foreign Aid Authorization Act for
1960, which appropriated $3.5 billion for foreign aid, yet declined to address any of the reforms
the Montana senator had proposed. 13 By mid-August 1959, less than two weeks after the
publication of Colegrove’s reports, foreign policy subcommittees in both the House and Senate
convened public and executive session hearings to probe the reporter’s allegations. Colegrove
and various officials and representatives, some of whom had been recalled from South Vietnam
specifically to participate in the hearings, gave sharply conflicting testimony. The House
subcommittee conducted a succinct and mostly uncritical examination of the affair, but the

Letter, James W. Riddleberger to J. W. Fulbright, Jul. 21, 1959, Mss 065, Series XIX, Box 559, Folder 30, Mike
Mansfield Papers.
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Oland D. Russell, “Mansfield Asks Prompt Probe of Viet Nam Aid,” Washington Daily News, Jul. 21, 1959.
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Senate subcommittee under Mansfield’s chairmanship decided to continue the investigation with
in-country interviews that would take place in the fall of 1959. After the initial hearings,
publications such as the New York Times and the Washington Post reported official rebukes of
Colegrove and rebuttals of his specific charges given by State and Defense Department
personnel, including the ambassador to South Vietnam and the director of the United States
Operations Mission. 14 These leading newspapers did not, however, furnish much of their own
analysis of the administrative concerns at the heart of Colegrove’s charges. As one Senate aide
predicted, the mainstream papers were expected to rely heavily on the subcommittee’s findings.
If the subcommittee ultimately rebuffed Colegrove’s claims, the staffer believed that the
“executive branch, the New York Times, and perhaps, the Washington Post, would find in [that
conclusion] proof that just about everything is right with the aid-program, and therefore
Congress should increase the appropriations.” 15
This paper argues that the Colegrove exposé and the political response to it represent an
important juncture, one in which the vastness, complexity, and nascency of the American
administrative state intersected with foreign policy, the Cold War, associational governance, and
changes in the media landscape to both obscure and shape public opinion about foreign aid.
Politicians like Mike Mansfield were able to cultivate credentials as nebulous as “foreign affairs
expert” based partially on the fact that no one, including the senator himself, could answer the
question of how to measure foreign aid’s successes and failures. Although fiscal conservatives in
Congress, mostly Southern Democrats, began to express discomfort about annual increases in

E. W. Kentworthy, “3 Top Officials Deny ‘Scandal’ in Aid from U.S. to Vietnam,” New York Times, Jul. 31,
1959; Gardiner L Bridge, “Full U.S. Aid Inquiry in Viet-Nam Proposed,” Washington Post, Aug. 1, 1959.
15
Memorandum, “Draft Report on Vietnamese Inquiry,” Frank Valeo to Mike Mansfield, Sep. 10, 1959, Mss 065,
Series XIX, Box 559, Folder 30, Mike Mansfield Papers.
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foreign aid as early as 1946, year after year throughout the 1950s, foreign aid bills continued to
pass with commanding majorities and relatively minor reductions in appropriation. It was not
until 1963 that Congress enacted any significant cuts to foreign aid, when it slashed President
John F. Kennedy’s appropriation request by 34 percent, the largest reduction in the history of the
program up to that point. Five years later in 1968, Congress again set a record by approving only
$1.76 billion for the next fiscal year, the lowest amount since World War II. Finally in 1971, a
foreign aid bill failed to pass for the first time ever. 16 The fact that these developments coincided
with the escalation of the Vietnam War are undeniable.
Yet, despite Mansfield’s dire predictions in 1959 that the American public would become
so disillusioned with the deficiencies of foreign aid administration that it would “swamp” the
entire undertaking, Gallup polling from the 1960s reveals that public support for foreign aid
remained above 50 percent throughout the decade. 17 What’s more, when pollsters asked
Americans if they thought foreign aid should be conditional on the receiving country’s support of
American foreign policy—particularly in Vietnam— 45 percent said the United States should cut
off aid completely to any nation that did not support our foreign policy in Southeast Asia, and
another 30 percent said that the amount of aid should be reduced. 18 An examination of
Colegrove’s interpretive journalism, the efforts of politicians like Mike Mansfield to restructure
foreign aid practices, and shifting public opinion about the foreign aid program and the
American state building efforts in Vietnam does not yield a neat throughline from media
spotlight to public outrage and Congressional reform. Still, a searching look at the reaction to

16
Historian Joseph Frye offers a succinct overview of Congressional appropriations battles over foreign aid in his
book Dixie Looks Abroad: The South and U.S. Foreign Relations, 1789-1973 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 2002) 251-254.
17
Gallup, “Survey #667-K,” “Survey #706-K,” and “Survey #724-K,” The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971,
vol. 3, 1959-1971 (1972): 1802, 1932, 1995.
18
Gallup, “Survey #724-K,” The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, vol. 3, 1959-1971 (1972): 1995.
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Colegrove’s reporting—from politicians, the media, and the public—reveals much about the
contingent, confusing, and associational nature of foreign aid in the first decade and a half after
the Marshall Plan. As Mansfield lamented in 1959, “We list indiscriminately as foreign aid the
cost of a squadron of fighter planes given to an unsteady government somewhere and the cost of
assigning a public health expert to a nation with a malaria problem. The effects of these actions
on us and others may be as different as night and day. The only thing they may really have in
common is that both cost us something.” 19 This paper analyzes perceptions of that cost in the
context of Vietnam and the Cold War.
There is vast and ever-expanding scholarship of the Vietnam era. This project
contributes to research of American foreign policy and state building efforts in Vietnam before
the ground war in the areas of development, political, and diplomatic history. 20 It also joins
studies of the media, American administrative state, associational governance, and the Cold War
as viewed through the complex lens of the Vietnam conflict. 21 Although Colegrove’s reporting
and the subsequent Congressional hearings it inspired are included in several histories of
American involvement in Vietnam, the episode generally receives little more than a passing

Mansfield, “A New Approach to Foreign Aid,” May 15, 1959.
On state-building and development in South Vietnam, see James M. Carter, Inventing Vietnam: The United States
and State Building, 1954-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Jessica Elkind, Aid Under Fire:
Nation Building and the Vietnam War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016); John Ernst, Forging a
Fateful Alliance (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1998). On diplomacy and congressional politics
during the Vietnam era, see Joseph Frye, Dixie Looks Abroad: The South and U.S. Foreign Relations, 1789-1973
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002; Andrew L. Johns, Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic
Politics, the Republican Party, and the War (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2010); Kathryn C. Statler,
Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
2007). On the history and origins of foreign aid more broadly, see David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission:
Modernization and Construction of an American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Daniel
Immerwahr, Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2015); John Norris, The Enduring Struggle: The History of the U.S. Agency for International
Development and America’s Uneasy Transformation of the World (Latham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021).
21
On media, see Lebovic, Speech and Unfree News; Pressman, On Press; Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer
(ed.), Media Nation: The Political History of News in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2017). On associational governance, see Brian Balogh, The Associational State: American Governance in the
Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
19
20
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mention. 22 In other instances, such as historian Joseph Frye’s monograph Dixie Looks Abroad:
The South and U.S. Foreign Relations, Congressional contestation over foreign aid is covered
extensively, but from a regional perspective, such as that of Southern Democrats, who
increasingly advocated as a bloc for the conversion of foreign aid expenditures to direct military
defense spending throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 23 Journalist Don Oberdorfer’s biography of
Mike Mansfield likewise provides an in-depth look at the Montana senator’s efforts to reform
foreign aid and the outsized role he played in advising three different presidents on Vietnam
policy, but as a biography, its focus is narrow and does not necessarily examine larger historical
questions. 24 In bringing together the Colegrove affair, Mansfield’s efforts to reshape foreign aid
administration, and public perception of the foreign aid program in the late 1950s and early
1960s, this paper provides a unique perspective of a Cold War moment. It was a moment in
which politicians like Mansfield attempted to balance the weight of secrecy and accountability
on the scales of a modern democracy, while also collecting capital to build a reputation. In
Mansfield’s case, knowledge of a topic as seemingly unknowable as the inner workings of
foreign aid helped sustain his career. At the same time, every day Americans were trying to make
sense of the obscurity surrounding foreign aid, evolving geopolitics, and humanitarian need
abroad to understand their government and their own position in the world.
*

*

*

For Mike Mansfield, a life-long interest in Asia began after he ran away from his home in
Great Falls, Montana. At fourteen years old, Mansfield lied about his age to enlist in the Navy

22
See, for example, Chapter 6 of William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive
and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part I, 1945-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
23
Frye, Dixie Looks Abroad.
24
Don Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield: The Extraordinary Life of a Great American Statesman and Diplomat
(Washington, D.C. and London: Smithsonian Books, 2003).

10
during World War I. After his discharge at the end of the war, Mansfield quickly re-enlisted, first
in the Army and then the Marines. The latter sent him briefly to the Philippines and China, and
although his military service in China lasted little more than a week, it was enough to captivate
him. Mansfield then returned to Montana and worked as a miner before continuing his education.
After earning his master’s degree, Mansfield taught East Asian and Latin American history at
Montana State University in Missoula until he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives
in 1942. 25 Thus, Mansfield arrived in Washington with a semi-established reputation as an Asian
affairs specialist. After serving five terms in the House of Representatives from Montana’s First
Congressional District, Mansfield’s constituents elected him to the U.S. Senate in 1952.
Mansfield’s transition from the House to the Senate coincided with the dawning of the
Cold War and the origins of the modern American foreign aid program. 26 Yet as the countries
receiving U.S. foreign aid shifted from Europe to Latin America, Asia, and Africa in the 1950s,
opposition to the program, particularly from Southern legislators, began to solidify. Scholars like
Joseph Frye contend that racism and the belief that non-white people would not use aid funds
wisely were important components of that fiscal conservatism. 27 After Mao Zedong led the

In 1965, the Montana state legislature renamed the university the University of Montana. Montana State College
in Bozeman then became known as Montana State University.
26
At the close of World War II in 1945, President Harry Truman extended the U.S. Export-Import Bank’s lending
authority to provide financial assistance from the government to American businesses exporting goods and services
abroad. That same year, Congress allocated $550 million for the United Nations’ Relief and Rehabilitation Agency.
The following year, in 1946, the legislature approved a $3.75 billion loan to the United Kingdom for its efforts to
rebuild after the war, and in 1947, Truman declared his namesake doctrine, effectively outlining a course for the
next 40 years of foreign policy, when he pledged American support for democracies around the world facing the
threat of communism. Even as Southern fiscal conservatives in Congress began to criticize the Truman Doctrine and
foreign aid spending, the Economic Recovery Act of 1948, more commonly known as the Marshall Plan, and its $13
billion aid package ultimately commanded solid support in both legislative chambers, in part because Southerners
saw the measure as an opportunity to recoup historic markets in Western Europe for American cotton and tobacco
products. From 1947 to 1948, the U.S. spent another $400 million on assistance to Greece and Turkey to quash
communist uprisings. Then in 1949, Truman outlined his Point Four Program for technical assistance and economic
aid to underdeveloped countries, and Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, which appropriated $1.3
billion to fund the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For more, see Joseph Frye’s Dixie Looks Abroad.
27
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communists to victory in China in 1949 and war broke out on the Korean Peninsula in 1950,
other Southern lawmakers pointed to these developments as proof that foreign aid was futile.
They began to argue for the conversion of foreign aid dollars to pure defensive military
spending, eventually forming the close political alliance with the Pentagon that Frye and others
have termed the “Dixie-Defense coalition.” 28 In return for solid protection of the Department of
Defense budget, the South became home to seven out of ten of the largest defense contractors in
the postwar years and the region most critical of foreign aid.
Nevertheless, the 1950s came with heightened American interest in Southeast Asia, and
Mike Mansfield emerged as one of the leading Congressional authorities on matters of the
region. In February 1950, the Truman Administration formally recognized the State of Vietnam,
yet also made the decision to extend aid to the French in the fight to reestablish their colonial
empire in Indochina. While many in his administration disdained the connection with
colonialism, Truman believed America could still display commitment to the ideals of the
Atlantic Charter and self-determination, while at the time pursuing U.S. goals for mutual security
in both Southeast Asia and Europe. The desire to maintain a strong post-war alliance with France
and the geopolitical conditions of Cold War convinced Truman and his advisors that French
colonial revival was preferable to an extension of communist influence. 29
The issue of regional free trade in Asia likewise took on a greater significance. With
communist China’s markets off limits, American policy makers sought to ensure trade remained
open between Japan and Southeast Asia, as they believed that Japan’s post-war recovery
depended on imports from its neighbors. It was in this context that political and economic
stability in Southeast Asia became one of the primary U.S. goals for the region. By aiding the
28
29

Frye, Dixie Looks Abroad, 237-238.
Carter, Inventing Vietnam, 20-23.
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French in Indochina, the U.S. sought to achieve this stability, while attempting to maintain a
critical distance from the bald imperialistic motives which governed France’s actions in the area.
Aid to the French in Indochina began in 1950 with $10 million and the establishment of the U.S.
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Saigon to oversee continued investments. By
1954, the amount had climbed to $354 million for that year alone, and still Vietnamese
revolutionaries led by communist Ho Chi Minh dealt the French a decisive defeat in the spring at
Dien Bien Phu. This effectively severed the French will to fight on in Indochina and ended that
phase of the war. 30
In September 1953, only eight months before the French capitulated at Dien Bien Phu,
Mansfield traveled to Europe and Indochina on a Senate study mission and concluded that the
military prospects of the French and the non-communist forces in Indochina were improving. 31 It
was a prime assignment for a freshman senator, and one of its main objectives was to assess the
role of American aid in the defense against international communism. In his report to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Mansfield emphasized that continuing American development
assistance in Indochina was justified and essential to U.S. security, heavily endorsing both
domino theory and France’s conduct of the war. Indeed, his attribution of France’s motives, that
she “is carrying on that war… [to] guard our flank in the common struggle… against communist
aggression throughout the world” bordered on the obsequious and contrasts sharply with later
statements he made to distance himself from any appearance of support of colonialism. 32 In the

Carter, Inventing Vietnam, 23-24.
“Report of Senator Mike Mansfield on a Study Mission to the Associated States of Indochina: Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos,” U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Oct. 27, 1953, Mss 065, Series XXI, Box 64, Folder
12, Mike Mansfield Papers.
32
Ibid.
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context of his contentious election to the Senate less than a year prior, it is unsurprising that
Mansfield adopted the hardline rhetoric of a staunch anticommunist. 33
Despite his praise of the French, Mansfield also raised concerns in his report about the
state of American foreign aid, both in Indochina and elsewhere. Specifically, he believed that the
program needed stricter administration, as “some informed observers in the area believe that
present procedures and undertakings are unduly wasteful.” 34 Foreshadowing the Colegrove
allegations in even starker terms, Mansfield wrote in a second report that technical and economic
aid, as contrasted with military aid, faced widespread criticism on the ground in Indochina.
During his visit, Mansfield encountered both locals and project administrators who were
aggravated about incompetent personnel, poorly planned projects, and the payment of
“incredible” prices for land and local services, with the “consequent enrichment of a few
speculators and labor contractors.” 35 He concluded that only a thorough and careful investigation
of the situation could determine the validity of such claims.
In addition to boosting Mansfield’s authority as a subject matter expert vis-à-vis
Vietnam, this study mission served to reinforce the Montana senator’s belief that some sort of
reorganization in the executive branch was necessary for more competent administration of
foreign aid. Evaluating the conflicting lines of authority and the overlap of effort that
characterized the administration of foreign aid, Mansfield began to argue that all disparate
agencies engaged in various non-military aid programs should be abolished and their duties

During that campaign, some of Mansfield’s detractors gave him the nickname “China Mike,” criticizing him as
soft on China and on communism. Senator Joseph McCarthy was one of Mansfield’s most active critics, even
descending on Montana to stump for Mansfield’s opponent. Though he triumphed at the polls, Mansfield won his
first senate race with the smallest margin of victory of his entire political career. Oberdorfer describes this episode in
Chapter 6 of Senator Mansfield.
34
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Committee on Foreign Affairs, Nov. 27, 1953, Mss 065, Series XXI, Box 64, Folder 12, Mike Mansfield Papers.
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centralized under the State Department. 36 Lastly, the trip convinced Mansfield that excess
personnel abroad constituted a “major irritant” to locals. Confronted with the “seeming luxury
and ease” of the lives American aid workers compared to their own standard of living, Mansfield
observed that European recipients of U.S. aid became resentful of American presence and
thought it likely that the same trend would continue in Southeast Asia. 37
As Mansfield grew more outspoken about the foreign aid program and the situation in
Indochina throughout the 1950s, his constituents frequently wrote to him expressing both support
and opposition to burgeoning public expenditures abroad. Neil Livingstone of Helena sent
Mansfield his views in 1951, stating that, although he was “not familiar with the many
ramifications and needs of foreign countries,” $8.5 billion dollars in the next fiscal year was too
much. Speaking for the National Affairs Committee of the Helena Chamber of Commerce,
Livingstone and other members felt the amount of aid should be capped at $5 billion and urged
Mansfield to do his part in “securing a balanced budget on a pay-as-you-go basis.” 38 The
existence of a “national affairs committee” of the local chamber of commerce, in and of itself,
speaks volumes about the political culture of civic life in a place like Helena, Montana, in the
early years of the Cold War, but Livingstone’s own admission of what he did not know of
foreign affairs is also telling. America’s role in the post-war order was confusing, but Livingston
somehow felt solid in his belief that $5 billion as opposed to $8.5 billion was enough to get the
job done. Nor were the members of Helena’s Chamber of Commerce the only ones to form a
national affairs committee at the local level. George Schotte, of the Butte Chamber of Commerce
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National Affairs Committee, contacted Mansfield in 1957 to express his dissatisfaction with the
excesses of foreign aid. With his letter, Schotte enclosed the chamber’s three-page report of
recommendations for the improvement of the foreign aid program for Mansfield’s
consideration. 39 Others, like Enid Matthews, were against cuts to foreign aid until “we have
achieved something nearer to parity with Russia and our allies are more securely on their feet.” 40
Similarly, Fred Riggs telegraphed: “Situation Asia Europe critical. Please oppose further cuts
[to] aid bill.” 41
As Americans were trying to make sense of their government’s new leadership role in
world affairs, the French gradually withdrew from Indochina. The 1954 Geneva Conference
divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel, and the United States began its descent in earnest into
entanglement in Southeast Asia. Yet even as foreign aid to Vietnam increased, Eisenhower’s
administration declined to adopt Mansfield’s suggestions about its administration. According to
the Geneva Conference, free elections were to take place in Vietnam in 1956, presumably
reuniting the country. Realizing that “free elections” would most likely install Ho Chi Minh and
a communist victory, the United States backed South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem’s
decision to cancel a vote altogether on the grounds that legitimate elections were not possible in
the communist North. Historian James M. Carter argues that this decision transformed the
American aid mission in Vietnam, giving it a larger purpose than ever before. It now sought to
create a whole new state, a whole new South Vietnam. 42
*

*

*
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Depending on the interpretive lens, the story of U.S. involvement with the rise and fall of
Ngo Dinh Diem as the leader of South Vietnam could be told in various measure as a fateful
misapplication of containment policy, a paternalistic and quixotic experiment in nation building,
a public relations campaign with a murderous twist ending, or a decision to stay the course for
lack of any viable alternatives. Scholars have adopted all of these and more in the vast literature
that exists on Diem and the eight years he spent at the helm of South Vietnam before a U.S.backed coup saw him deposed and assassinated by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in
1963. 43 Diem is a central figure, yet his points of intersection with Mansfield, the American
foreign aid program, the media, and American public perception have been lesser explored.
Given the cascading ramifications of Diem’s administration and overthrow in the
unfolding of the Vietnam conflict, the chain of events that led to his rise to power seems
fortuitous in the extreme. Diem was a staunch nationalist, anticommunist, and Catholic, who had
previously served as a cabinet minister under French rule. He went into exile during the first
phase of the French-Indochina war, and while he lived abroad, he met an academic and former
Asian language specialist with the U.S. military named Wesley Fishel. In 1951, Fishel took a
post at Michigan State University and got Diem appointed as a consultant on Southeast Asia
with the university’s government research bureau, which was established with technical
assistance funds. From there, Diem’s connections snowballed, and he soon found himself on the
radar of Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. Douglas, known for his passionate
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politicking from the bench, was a strong anti-colonialist who opposed American foreign aid to
France and became one of Diem’s earliest and most ardent promoters. 44
On May 7, 1953, Douglas hosted a breakfast meeting in Washington, D.C., where he
introduced Diem to both Mansfield and then-Senator John F. Kennedy. Douglas presented Diem
to the senators as a “Third Way” candidate for leadership of Vietnam, an option who was both
anti-colonialist and anti-communist, and Douglas’s advocating for Diem didn’t stop there. He
also introduced Diem to the deputy director of the CIA, Robert Armory; the publisher of Time
and Life, Henry Luce; and the Archbishop of New York, Cardinal Francis Spellman. As scholars
like James Moses have shown, these introductions not only laid the foundation for Diem’s
installation as prime minister of South Vietnam after France announced its decision to withdraw
from Indochina in 1954, but also set the dynamic for future relationships between U.S. advisors,
Diem, and foreign aid efforts to maintain the viability of a “free” South Vietnam. 45
From the time of their initial meeting in 1953 until the Colegrove exposé, Mansfield was
an enthusiastic and unreserved supporter of Diem. From the mid- to late 1950s, Mansfield played
a significant role in preserving Diem’s regime when members within the Eisenhower
Administration considered the possibility of installing different leadership in South Vietnam.
Appointed by the Eisenhower as a special advisor to the Republic of Vietnam, General Joseph
Lawton Collins became one of the leading U.S. officials suggesting a regime change in 1955
after experiencing serious doubts about Diem’s ability to unite the various factions in South
Vietnam. In a letter from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to Collins, Dulles revealed that,
up to that point, the U.S. backed Diem and “backed him 100% because (a) nobody better
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appeared on the horizon, and (b) because no one can survive without wholehearted backing.” 46
Mansfield had completed another Senate study mission to Southeast Asia that previous fall and
met with Diem in Saigon. Though Mansfield received reports during this trip that Diem was an
inconsistent and ineffectual leader, he felt strongly that there was no alternative to Diem if the
Republic of Vietnam was to survive as a free, noncommunist state.
Not only did Mansfield argue to stay the course with Diem at the helm, but he also
predicated the entire American foreign aid mission in Vietnam on Diem, stating in a Senate
speech: “In the event that the Diem government falls… I believe that the United States should
consider an immediate suspension of all aid to Vietnam… Unless there is a reasonable
expectation of fulfilling our objectives the continued expenditure of the resources of the citizens
of the United States is unwarranted and inexcusable.” 47 Despite Mansfield’s party affiliation, the
Eisenhower Administration, particularly Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, relied heavily on
his counsel when crafting Vietnam policy. In a top-secret cable from Dulles to the ambassador to
Vietnam, Dulles predicted a strong negative reaction from Congress if Diem was replaced,
adding that “Mansfield, who is looked upon with great respect by his colleagues with reference
to this matter, is adamantly opposed to abandonment of Diem under present conditions.” 48
Criticism of Diem was not limited to elite officials or American advisors. A Vietnamese
doctor and political organizer named Nguyen Ton Hoan wrote to Mansfield in the fall of 1955 to
express his dismay over Diem’s oppressive tactics, including his censorship of the press and
imprisonment of his political opponents. Hoan, who like the South Vietnamese leader, was both

“Letter from the Secretary of State to the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins),” April 20, 1955, Office of
the Historian, U.S. Department of State, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v01/d128.
47
Speech by Mike Mansfield prepared for Senate delivery, Apr. 29, 1955, Mss 065, Series XXI, Box 38, Folder 62,
Mike Mansfield Papers.
48
“Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam,” Apr. 9, 1955, Office of the Historian, U.S.
Department of State, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v01/d109.
46

19
a staunch nationalist and Catholic, claimed that he had traveled to the United States to persuade
the American government and its people “that time is running out on South Vietnam.” Hoan
hoped to gain a meeting with Mansfield to convince him that the United States must “help stop
Diem’s experiment in despotism and bring about a political reconciliation and democracy.” 49 No
response from Mansfield is included in his papers, other than a form letter from his office stating
that the senator was back home in Montana, but assuring Hoan his views on the “Vietnamese
situation” would be much appreciated. 50 Hoan’s portrayal of the “Vietnamese situation” presents
a stark contrast to the letter of congratulations that Mansfield sent Diem only eight months prior.
Extending his well wishes for the new year in 1955, Mansfield wrote to Diem, thanking him for
his outstanding and courageous leadership, stating “I am aware of the many difficulties which
have confronted you since you have assumed office, but I think your adherence to principles and
sound moral grounds are taking root. We in America have great respect for your integrity and
patriotism, and we know how extremely hard it has been to achieve the type of unity and
understanding so necessary for the survival of free Vietnam.” 51 In 1957, Diem made a return
visit to Washington when Mansfield lauded him yet again, declaring the Vietnamese president
“not only the savior of his own country, but… the savior of all of Southeast Asia.” 52 Mansfield’s
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public support of Diem would abruptly drop off after Colegrove’s allegations in 1959, but in the
mid-1950s, his backing of South Vietnam’s first president was both solid and significant. 53
Although public discussion of the foreign aid program in Vietnam was more muted
during 1956 and 1957, foreign aid dollars continued to flow, not only into military, economic,
and technical assistance projects in Southeast Asia, but also into a concerted public relations
campaign within the United States to support Diem and American-backed nation building efforts
in his country. The American Friends of Vietnam (AFV), a non-profit lobby that sprang out of
the connections forged by Justice Douglas, secured foreign aid money to hire the Oram Group, a
Madison Avenue consulting firm, which according to one critical piece, “literally flooded the
country with glowing but completely false reports of Diem’s popularity and South Vietnam’s
new strides towards democracy.” 54 Indeed, Mansfield received several pro-Diem letters from
members of the public. One of those came from Mrs. Harvey Wiley, a self-identified
Episcopalian and average American citizen, who wished to thank Mansfield for his continued
backing of Diem, whose characteristics of “uncompromising honesty and incorruptibility” were
“rare in the politics of any country, much less in that far-away land, so long dominated by French
corruption and immorality.” 55 Mrs. Wiley’s letter predates Oram’s involvement, but she states
that she had been following Diem’s story in the press for “quite some time.” 56
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In addition to utilizing foreign aid to take the Diem campaign to Madison Avenue, the
American Friends of Vietnam also spawned its own private committee to handle foreign aid
contracts in Vietnam in 1956. To anyone unfamiliar with the associational nature of foreign aid,
the AFV’s Committee on Educational and Cultural Assistance to Vietnam could have easily been
mistaken for a Congressional delegation. The committee’s official mission was to secure
“financial, material, and technical aid in the field of private education and cultural activities in
South Vietnam.” 57 In 1957, the AFV and the government of South Vietnam jointly announced a
set of incentives designed to lure private investment, including guarantees against nationalization
without compensation, a three-year real estate tax exemption for new construction projects, and a
100-percent tax exemption on income derived from investment in Vietnam for the first year. 58
An examination of the influence of groups like the American Friends of Vietnam adds yet
another dimension to how foreign aid administration actually functioned on the ground in
recipient nations. In the case of the AFV, this private organization did not just react to, but also
actively shaped foreign policy through the conduct of its day-to-day interactions in both Vietnam
and the United States. Even more unreservedly than Mansfield, the AFV had tied the stakes of
the American foreign aid program in Vietnam to Diem’s leadership. That became a problem as
Diem’s regime turned more authoritarian in the late 1950s.
*

*

*

“One hundred years ago, Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote a novel that persuaded hordes of
people previously indifferent that human slavery was a viscous evil. Today, a book is published
whose authors hope to persuade hordes of people that unless drastic changes are made in
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American policy in Southeast Asia communism will triumph from Assam to Bali. The book is
The Ugly American by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick.” 59 On October 1, 1958, the New
York Times published this review of a novel about American aid workers in the fictional country
of Sarkahn, which the reviewer surmised was a mash-up of Thailand and Cambodia. The story
alluded to thousands of Americans in Southeast Asia in various economic, military, political, and
diplomatic posts, characterizing many of them as “second-raters happy in soft jobs at high pay
and many unaccustomed luxuries” who antagonize the local population with their arrogance,
condescension, and refusal to learn or care about the culture or customs of their host country. 60
The authors of The Ugly American argued that, when it came to foreign aid in Southeast Asia,
simple projects that impart agricultural or engineering knowledge in the local language by
“modest men” would do the most good. In the epilogue, Lederer and Burdick stated that the book
was based in fact.
Predictably, The Ugly American caused a stir at the executive branch and among aid
workers and diplomatic communities, but the novel also found an audience outside these elite
circles, spending 76 weeks on the best seller list and selling five million copies. 61 After the book
came out, Mansfield sent a letter to Burdick inviting The Ugly American authors to meet with
him in Washington and expressing his “delight” that they were assembling material to send him
in connection with the study of foreign aid reform. 62 It is unclear what came of that meeting, if it
ever happened, but The Ugly American undoubtedly set the stage for Colegrove to publish, as
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many of the reporter’s allegations would sound familiar to those who had read Lederer and
Burdick.
In May 1959, Mike Mansfield was back on the Senate floor giving yet another speech
about foreign aid as Congress debated appropriations for another fiscal year:
Mr. President: It is the time of another foreign aid bill. Those of us who have
been in Congress long enough have seen more than a decade of continuous
organized programs of assistance. We have lived with four principle postwar
aid agencies in succession – the ECA, the MSA, the FOA, and now the ICA.
We have witnessed the annual level of appropriations go up and we have
witnessed it come down... It is common practice to say that we have put 60 to
70 billion dollars into foreign aid since the close of World War II…The fact is
that is that figure tells us very little, because it is a composite figure… Having
lumped a dozen dissimilar undertakings together as the foreign aid program,
we try to measure total effect in terms of success or failure. It cannot be
done. 63
It had been five years since the French withdrawal from Vietnam, and, despite his
continued support for Diem, Mansfield’s weariness with the state of the American foreign aid
program was palpable. Predicting the same pattern that dominated past debates over aid
appropriations, he stated his belief that, despite doubt and dissatisfaction, Congress would
probably “go along” with foreign aid for another year because it was not prepared to dispute “as
non-essential what the President has labeled as essential to the nation.” 64 Prescient of what was
to come, Mansfield restated his assessment that the public was growing uneasy about foreign aid,
not out of a retreat from international responsibility or a selfish resistance to helping others, but
in response to the “administrative decadence” with which foreign aid was being translated into
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action around the world. Using the exact same phrase as the Vietnamese doctor who wrote to
warn him about Diem in 1955, Mansfield declared that “time was running out” on foreign aid.

65

Despite his close relationship with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Mansfield’s
speech was most damning in its indictment of the Eisenhower Administration and its failure to
act after Congress had spent years studying foreign aid in detail in committees throughout the
late 1950s. Stating that these Congressional studies had “brought evidence of corruption and
signs of mismanagement which border on the scandalous” to light, Mansfield charged the
administration with cherry picking Congressional recommendations on how to improve the aid
program, to the effect that very little improvement was made at all. 66 In conclusion Mansfield
proposed amendments to the Foreign Aid Authorization Act which would place the
administration of economic and technical aid fully under the Department of State and military
aid under the Department of Defense, the same suggestions to tighten the bureaucracy that he
made six years prior, along with a few other, newer suggestions. 67 As Mansfield predicted they
would, his Congressional colleagues voted on July 8, 1959, to authorize $3.5 billion of the $3.9
billion originally requested by the executive without taking up his amendments. Indeed,
Mansfield himself cast a yea vote for the appropriations. This year, however, a reporter named
Albert Colegrove was about to call out the “administrative decadence” Mansfield had warned of,
with a lot more cynicism and splash. Not only that, but Colegrove’s reporting would soon link
the notion of scandal and American foreign aid to a highly specific place: Vietnam. It was an
association that would become indelible.
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Colegrove’s first article strongly echoed both The Ugly American as well as some of
Mansfield’s own claims from 1953 about foreign aid. Indicting the plush existence of American
expat life in Vietnam, Colegrove posed the question:
Who wants to rock the boat when his cozy bachelor apartment or spacious
family villa comes absolutely rent free? Who wants to tilt the applecart when
he draws down $400-$800 a year extra to offset the fictious high cost of living
in Saigon, where he can buy American cigarettes tax-free for 10 cents a pack
and groceries for himself for $1 a day? Who wants to climb on the soapbox
when he’s permitted a two-hour midday siesta, is chauffeured to and from
work in a government car, and gets up to $319 a month in so-called hardship
pay for his dauntless willingness to endure the tensions and vicissitudes of a
city that’s properly renowned as the Paris of the Orient? 68
Disregarding advice to stick to Saigon, Colegrove claimed to have traveled from the rice paddies
in the south to Quang Tri Province in the north and to have spoken with provincial chiefs,
prisoners, refugees—Vietnamese and Americans—from business professionals to intellectuals,
big and little workers in both governments, including Ngo Dinh Diem himself. 69
Opening his second article with a question, Colegrove asked: “Suppose you have a young
son who has never driven a car. Would you buy him a Cadillac, hand him $100 and an
instruction book and then tell him to run along and amuse himself?” 70 Likening that scenario
“what we are doing [in Vietnam] on a multi-million dollar scale,” Colegrove detailed the fact
that American aid program was buying “jeeps, trucks, guns, tractors, factories, and even whole
radio networks” for an agricultural economy that lacked the know-how to use them. 71 Continuing
in the same paternalistic vein, Colegrove’s subsequent articles nevertheless relayed examples of
corruption in the bidding and contracting processes; unaccountability for U.S. government
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property, including some 2,700 missing vehicles; and the incomprehensibility of the counterpart
program, whereby aid dollars were converted to local currency and sometimes, in the case of 22
million piastres, just disappeared from the books. 72 Ending the series with a piece on Diem’s
“hard-fisted rule” of the Republic of Vietnam, Colegrove argued that a police state, financed by
U.S. aid, had developed in South Vietnam. Signing off, he questioned what it cost America, not
just in dollars but also reputationally, to continue its unwavering support of Diem solely for his
anticommunism. 73
Even before Scripps-Howard newspapers ran Colegrove’s final article, staff members
supporting the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and its Subcommittee on State
Department Organization were frenetically gathering evidence and marshalling witnesses in
advance of the hearings. One of Colegrove’s sources, an International Cooperation
Administration employee working in Vietnam, secretly came forward to talk with Mansfield’s
aide Francis Valeo and the committee’s chief of staff Carl Marcy, who were performing much of
the organizational work for the Senate investigation. The informant, identified in memos only as
“Mr. Scott,” tried to keep his involvement concealed from the ICA out of fear that he’d be
terminated for speaking up. Claiming that policy guidance from the State Department was
nonexistent throughout the range of technical and economic aid projects in Vietnam, Scott also
noted that the “Vietnamese despise us and ask why we are so easily corrupted.” 74 In a sidebar
worthy of Colegrove, Scott alleged that the ICA, suspecting him to be the reporter’s source, gave
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him an ultimatum right before the hearings commenced: either voluntarily submit to psychiatric
treatment, which would discredit him as a source, or he would be fired. 75 According to Valeo
and Marcy, “the informant was obviously in a high state of tension, although rational and an
extremely intelligent man.” 76 The ICA fired Scott after his testimony in mid-August. 77
Marcy, Valeo, and another Senate staffer, John Newhouse, played instrumental roles in
coordinating the logistics of the subcommittee’s investigations, both in Washington and later in
Saigon, under Mansfield’s close supervision. In the lead up to the hearings, the aides met with
more witnesses, including a liaison of the General Accounting Office (GAO), a man named
Owen Kane. Kane told Valeo that GAO issued two studies on the aid program in Vietnam in
November 1958 that foreshadowed most of Colegrove allegations, which the GAO shared with
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Kane was frank in his disappointment at the reception
these studies received at the time. 78 In addition, Marcy and Newhouse interviewed a mass
communications specialist named Wallace Gade, who had previously worked in Southeast Asia
and was in general agreement with Colegrove’s conclusions. Gade said he believed the same
errors and deficiencies exhibited in South Vietnam were also present and true of other aid
programs in Southeast Asian countries. Specifically, Gade corroborated Colegrove’s allegations
about Radio Vietnam and the debacle over the 50,000-watt transmitter. 79
There were plenty of Colegrove detractors on the witness list as well. The Senate
Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Public Affairs convened public hearings
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about the articles’ allegations on July 30 and 31, 1959. A week later, it explored some of the
issues in greater detail in closed-door executive sessions on August 7, 11, and 12. After hearing
testimony from Colegrove, Ambassador to Vietnam Elbridge Durbrow, U.S. Operations Mission
(USOM) Director Arthur Z. Gardiner, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group
(MAAG) Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, and other representatives of the foreign aid
program in Saigon, some members of the subcommittee were satisfied that the statements of
these individuals debunked Colegrove’s charges and wanted to close the investigation. 80
Mansfield and others disagreed. Eventually the Mansfield contingent prevailed, and the
subcommittee agreed to send a staff delegation to Vietnam to investigate the aid program in
more detail. According to Mansfield’s memos, the consensus was for a quick turnaround to
“avoid any impression that the Committee is stalling on inquiry.” 81 In addition, Newhouse
punctually drafted an interim report based on the committee’s findings. In it, he summarized:
After some thirty hours of testimony, the Subcommittee has tentatively divided
Mr. Colegrove’s allegations and critical inferences into two categories. First,
his most serious charges of waste and misuse of funds are regarded as having
been satisfactorily explained by Government witnesses. It is believed that Mr.
Colegrove, had he chosen to check his regrettably misleading conclusions with
responsible officials, would also have received a satisfactory explanation for
most of them. It is the judgment of the Committee that his failure to seek this
type of corroboration was inconsistent with sound journalism. 82
However, Mansfield’s notes on this draft are revealing. For instance, when Newhouse wrote
about Colegrove’s “uniformly immoderate, frequently inflammatory” tone and attempted to link
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Colegrove’s prose style to his credibility, Mansfield commented, “Forget his style.” 83
Additionally, when Newhouse touted the survival of the “courageous little anticommunist
republic” that has “reached a stage in its overall development… that has exceeded our fondest
expectations,” Mansfield pointedly asked, “Whose fondest expectations?” 84 Mansfield’s notes on
the draft culminated in his biggest issue with that version of the report: that it did not address
basic issue of ineffectual aid administration.
Despite the preference of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William
Fulbright for issuing the report without delay, Mansfield pushed back and fought for more time.
He also sought Valeo’s advice. In a memo dated September 10, 1959, Valeo conveyed his belief
to Mansfield that the interim report showed a “marked predisposition to accept the arguments of
the Executive Branch at face value and to dismiss those of Colegrove very lightly.” 85 Valeo
agreed with Mansfield that the chief fault of the draft was that it largely ignored the broad
administrative and legislative questions which were implicit in Colegrove’s specific allegations.
Arguing that these were far more germane to the subcommittee’s purpose than the charges
themselves, Valeo urged Mansfield to postpone the report until they had more information.
Mansfield agreed and declined to issue any draft of the report. 86
In the fall of 1959, a Congressional delegation from both houses traveled to Vietnam to
continue the investigation. While there, the delegation officially distanced itself from
Colegrove’s allegations to avoid antagonizing the Diem regime, which was incensed by the
unfavorable press, and American aid program administrators, most of whom also bitterly
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resented the exposé. Instead, the delegation cast its inquiry as merely part of the normal business
of Congressional oversight. 87 Meanwhile, Colegrove himself was not able to return to Vietnam
to cover the investigation that his reporting instigated, because Diem’s administration refused to
reissue his visa. 88
Even though Mansfield did not personally accompany the delegation, he still played a
critical role in defining the parameters of the inquiry and drawing out conclusions that reinforced
his earlier calls for aid reform. His influence was most felt in the lead up to the official
delegation when Senate aides Marcy, Newhouse, and Valeo traveled to Vietnam several weeks
in advance of the actual commission. Their goal was to conduct an in-depth study of aid
administration practices—the very heart of the issue as far as Mansfield was concerned.
Throughout this preliminary investigation, the aides pursued the principal lines of inquiry that
Mansfield had outlined, seeking to evaluate the overall direction of purpose of the aid program as
well as its efficiency and integrity. Marcy, Newhouse, and Valeo also committed to examining
the qualifications, quantity, and lifestyles of in-country aid workers and American advisors as a
primary objective. 89 Giving the trio clear instructions to fly under the radar of publicity,
Mansfield urged them to cast a wide net and talk to anyone who might be a possible source of
information, not just executives and high-level program managers. 90
In contrast to the direct leadership that he provided to the aides, Mansfield had much less
authority over the on-the-ground conduct of the official delegation once it arrived in November.
There were only two Foreign Relations Committee members who made the trip: Senators Bourke
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B. Hickenlooper, a Republican from Iowa, and Albert Gore, a Democrat from Tennessee. The
rest of the eight-person delegation represented other Congressional committees and interests.
This became apparent as sharp disagreements arose almost immediately about what course the
investigation should take and what conclusions the delegation would draw from its observations.
Senator Gore and fellow Democrat Gale McGee, of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
interpreted the state of American aid in the country in wildly different manners. While McGee
saw “the most exciting and imaginative [aid program] of any… around the world,” Gore was
“shocked and disturbed at the slack-jawed laxness with which our tax money is being
handled.” 91 Even along partisan lines, there was no coherent view of the situation.
For all intents and purposes, two separate Congressional inquiries into the American aid
program in South Vietnam took place that fall. The official delegation was both brief and mired
by its own attempts to investigate the specifics of Colegrove’s allegations without overtly
appearing to do so. 92 Finding no concrete evidence of corruption but also unable to agree that the
aid program was effective, the delegation devolved into a similar stalemate that had gridlocked
the original hearings. Marcy, Newhouse, and Valeo, on the other hand, framed their study
according to Mansfield’s directive and ultimately produced the bulk of the conclusions and
recommendations that the subcommittee would advance in its final report.
Throughout the course of 1959, interpretive reporting of the American foreign aid
program was on the rise. While the New York Times coverage of the Colegrove hearings hewed
mostly factual with little editorialization outside the opinion pages, other publications did begin
to suggest new courses of action for foreign aid that differed from the “official” prescriptions of
politicians like Mansfield. For example, America Magazine suggested that instead of trying to
91
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convince the public to support foreign aid for economic or national security reasons, more
emphasis should be given to the moral weight of helping poorer countries raise their standard of
living. Stating that “foreign aid would fare better both at home and abroad if only it were
presented more idealistically,” the magazine was making its own argument, which was very
different from the Congressional din over the program. 93 Like the New York Times, the
Washington Post in the late 1950s still had at least one ear turned towards the echo chamber.
Still, certain Post headlines during the Colegrove episode did adopt a critical tone. For example,
the verb choice in “Democratic Group in Senate Attacks ‘Blank Check’ Foreign Aid Spending”
is revealing. 94 Unsurprisingly, the headline writer for a Scripps-Howard article covering the
Colegrove hearings displayed his own bias: “Senators See ‘Much Good’ in Aid Probe.” 95
*

*

*

In February 1960, under Mansfield’s chairmanship, the Senate Subcommittee on State
Department Organization and Public Affairs issued its final report on foreign aid administration
in Vietnam. In the document, the subcommittee restated its belief in the original intent of the
foreign aid program in South Vietnam—to prevent communist takeover—and its commitment to
serve mutual security interests. However, the driving force of the report was its call to change
foreign aid administration. 96 While the original draft, which Mansfield declined to publish in the
immediate aftermath of the Congressional hearings, focused almost exclusively on answering
Colegrove’s allegations point by point, the Scripps-Howard reporter and his individual claims
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took a backseat in the final report. Making only brief references to Colegrove, the report
concluded that “the specific charges raised in the newspaper articles do not generally lend
themselves to proof or disproof by a legislative body.” 97 Furthermore, it framed the uproar over
the exposé as a misunderstanding arising from “differing interpretations of the same situations,
with critics seeing primarily evidence of wrongdoing and ineptitude and responsible officials
seeing primarily extenuating circumstances.” 98 Given the confused view of foreign aid held not
only by the individual members of the subcommittee, but also the constituents they represented,
the tepid conclusion to the Colegrove chapter is hardly surprising but also unlikely to have
satisfied anyone. Again, Mansfield’s voice rose to the fore to address the same overarching
question he had been asking for years: how could the administration of the American aid
program be improved?
The first recommendation the subcommittee proposed was to require the executive
branch to submit a detailed plan for each country receiving large-scale grants of nonmilitary
aid. 99 For South Vietnam and elsewhere, the report reiterated Mansfield’s belief that a successful
American aid program should promote its own eventual obsoletion. This point was nearly
identical to one that Mansfield made the previous year, before Colegrove published, when he
tried and failed to introduce amendments to the Mutual Security Act of 1954. 100 Through the
subcommittee, he once again called on the State Department to enumerate specific ways to
increase South Vietnamese economic self-reliance, so that the young country could eventually be
weaned off American aid.
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Addressing a primary thread of the administrative confusion, the report also argued for
new legislation that would spell out the authority for ambassadors in posts abroad. 101
Specifically, what powers do they have to make decisions about foreign aid in the respective
countries they serve? Since the U.S. Mission in Vietnam operated under an executive order, the
subcommittee believed that the ambassador, Elbridge Durbrow, should have the ultimate
responsibility for American operations in the country. Yet the reality of the situation on the
ground was much different. Each of the various U.S. agencies operating in South Vietnam all
reported back to their individual headquarters in Washington, making the prospect for unified
control or coordination all but impossible.102
Consolidating authority for foreign aid and reducing the top-heavy control of aid
programs in Washington had been two of Mansfield’s main reform goals since 1953, so it was
unsurprising that both issues resurfaced in the subcommittee’s final report. Extolling the aid
program as the “single greatest expression of American policy in Vietnam” the subcommittee
indicted the bloated bureaucracy in Washington that resulted in many unnecessary and
burdensome delays for aid projects on the ground. 103 In the case of nonmilitary aid, the
subcommittee discovered that nearly 50 separate executive departments, agencies, or
subdivisions were involved somehow in the planning or execution of the program each year,
even before Congress approved the appropriations to fund it. 104
In terms of the official American community, the subcommittee regurgitated even more
of Mansfield’s earlier suggestions. Finding that the executive branch must make a concerted
effort to improve local perceptions of American officials living abroad, it recommended a full
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study of the pay and fringe benefits they received for participating in overseas service. This is
one of the very few instances in the report that attaches merit to a specific Colegrove charge.
Conceding that Americans generally “lived at a level far above modest and comfortable,” the
subcommittee argued that the State and Defense Departments needed to substantially reshape
housing allowances and acquisition procedures to reduce excesses in lifestyle and habit. It further
recommended eliminating hardship payments and in-kind assistance for all American personnel
in South Vietnam—both military and civilian. 105
The final report acknowledged one other direct link to the Colegrove allegations: the
radio project that the Scripps-Howard reporter claimed encapsulated the “whole fantastic story”
and mess of the aid program in Vietnam. Likening Radio Vietnam to a “Pandora’s box of
confusion, misunderstanding, and infectiveness,” the subcommittee also ascribed a central
allegorical role to the project. 106 Stating that it embodied “just about all the frustrations and
difficulties which can beset aid undertakings,” the report traced miscommunications about the
project to the beginning of U.S. involvement in the country after the French evacuated. 107
Because American advisors and the South Vietnamese never shared a common understanding
about the basic purpose for radio development, in practice, radio transmission remained
unchanged despite the expenditure of over half a million aid program dollars for wages,
consultants, and equipment upgrades. While the subcommittee was unable to document outright
corruption or misuse of public funds, the investigation of Radio Vietnam suggested that careless
disregard for conflicts of interest would be the least malignant interpretation of the situation. It
concluded with the recommendation that the Inspector General take the case from there. 108
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*

*

*

In the late 1980s, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee commissioned a
comprehensive study of the executive and legislative roles that led the United States into war in
Vietnam. Despite the substantial effort that Congress spent investigating the foreign aid program
in the Republic of Vietnam, the study contended that there was no evidence that the Colegrove
hearings or the subsequent recommendations of the Mansfield subcommittee had any significant
effect on American activities in Southeast Asia. 109 If anything, the 1986 report argued that they
appear to have been a diversion, funneling energy into inquiries of waste at the exact time that
the communists in Vietnam were ramping up for round two of the revolution. The study also
attributed a basic lack of Congressional interest in Vietnam in the late 1950s to the muted
reception of Mansfield’s recommendations on foreign aid.
It would be an understatement to say there was no coherent view of the successes and
failures of American foreign aid in the 1950s, even along party lines. Mansfield and the rest of
the subcommittee remained dedicated to preserving democracy in South Vietnam and never
questioned its stability as crucial to American interests, reflecting the automatic acceptance of
certain perceptions of Cold War political reality. Even in its final report in 1960, after Mansfield
became arguably less sure about the viability and merit of the Diem regime, the subcommittee
refrained from any criticism of the South Vietnamese government. Issuing a disclaimer that any
failings that may or may not exist on the part of the Vietnamese government are the concern of
the Vietnamese people, the subcommittee stated that even if such shortcomings did involve the
United States, they should be addressed by the executive branch, which carries the responsibility
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for conducting foreign relations. 110 Considering the wide range of players actually engaged in the
day-to-day conduct of foreign relations, the claim is fairly ironic, but nevertheless shows how
deeply averse politicians like Mansfield were to any upset of the political balance in South
Vietnam.
Still, there is strong evidence that indicates Mansfield’s private thinking about Diem
underwent a dramatic shift in the wake of the Colegrove investigation. Ambassador to Vietnam
Elbridge Durbrow gave an interview in 1978, nearly 20 years after the foreign aid probe, in
which he recalled Mansfield’s serious doubts about American strategy in South Vietnam, even at
that relatively early stage. When he went back to Washington to testify in the Colegrove
hearings, Durbrow said he talked one-on-one with Mansfield off the record. In the interview,
Durbrow related the encounter:
Whether it was the Colegrove articles or something else, or an accumulation of
things, [Mansfield] was as cold as ice. To me personally, he was polite, nothing
rude, but he was cold, and he had been fairly warm before, particularly about
Diem. He talked to me personally about Diem’s lack of democracy and alleged
corruption and all of that. As far as I was concerned, he was turned off to Diem by
that time. 111
After his extensive study of the foreign aid program, Mansfield understood the substance of
Colegrove’s reporting to be accurate, and he refrained in its aftermath from the extravagant
public praise of Diem that was characteristic of his statements about Vietnam before the ScrippsHoward exposé. Mansfield, however, never publicly endorsed Colegrove’s reporting and kept his
distance from Colegrove even in private when the reporter requested a meeting with him in July
of 1959. 112 In contrast to his reaction to the publication of The Ugly American, when Mansfield
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congratulated the authors and invited them to contribute their ideas on foreign aid reform, the
correspondence between Mansfield and Colegrove is both to the point and aloof. The bulk of
their exchange consists of Colegrove sending the senator more information to back up his
claims. 113 Perhaps Mansfield felt that Colegrove, as a representative of the media, had to be kept
more at bay. But it is also possible that Mansfield understood many in Washington found
Colegrove’s “sensationalism” off-putting as the reporter pushed boundaries that simply were not
pushed at that time by the dignified media men of the Gridiron Club. 114 It is likewise probable
that the Montana senator was reevaluating his public friendship with Ngo Dinh Diem, and
Colegrove certainly was no fan of South Vietnam’s president.
The idea that debates over foreign aid in the 1950s were merely a distraction in light of
the war that followed does not hold weight. Many of the subcommittee’s recommendations did
eventually get incorporated into executive reorganization of foreign aid administration. Under
the Kennedy Administration, Congress passed the Foreign Aid Act of 1961, which created the
US Agency for International Development (USAID), consolidating the authority of all nonmilitary aid under the new agency, just as Mansfield had suggested. The act also represented a
significant overhaul of the ideological principle of foreign aid, whereby development supplanted
mutual security as the raison d'être of the program. The Foreign Aid Act of 1961 also
accompanied an appropriation for $40,000,000 to fund the first year of the Peace Corps. The act
continues as the legal foundation for foreign aid policy to this day.
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In 2017, President Trump pledged massive cuts to foreign aid, deriding the notion that the
U.S. should give any assistance whatsoever to “people who hate us.” 115 Against this rhetoric,
polling revealed that some Americans believe that 20 percent of the federal budget goes to
foreign aid, when the real number hovers between 1 to 2 percent. 116 Sixty years later and the
issue of foreign aid still perplexes. It still brings up important questions about how we perceive
our democracy and our government’s role in the world and how we process the gaze reflecting
back at us, especially if it is critical or unflattering. Beyond the creation of USAID, the
Colegrove episode and the attempts of politicians, the public, and the media to understand the
complex and contingent issue of foreign aid are significant for the window they provide on a
unique moment, after the United States emerged from one war with a new national narrative but
before it plunged into another that would fracture that narrative in lasting ways.
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